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A reply to my critics Although in theory history is – in the words of 
the Dutch historian Pieter Geyl – “a discussion 
without an end”, in practice only few of us ac-
tually enjoy the benefit of having their ideas 
commented on and criticised collectively by a 
number of informed colleagues. This is a rea-
son to be grateful in itself and I want to thank 
Krzysztof Brzechczyn very much for organis-
ing this event. In my reply, I will try to deal with 
some of the comments and questions raised by 
my critics, and I take the liberty of lumping ques-
tions together for some of the themes.
The first theme concerns my take on philosophy 
of science in general and the relationship be-
tween my position and positivism of the Hemp-
elian kind, that is the “covering-law model of 
explanation” (which I will refer to as CLM) in par-
ticular. Questions in this domain have been for-
mulated by Ewa Domańska, Krzysztof Brzech-
czyn and Hayden White. 
First of all, I have to dispense with the serious 
misunderstanding that my position is somehow 
identical or similar to the CLM, as White seems 
to read me. Nothing could be wider of the mark 
because, as I have argued in depth – especially in 
my book Constructing the Past – I regard the CLM 
not only as not valid for the humanities, but also as 
invalid as a rational reconstruction of the sciences. 
Post-positivism since Popper has damaged be-
yond repair the claim of the CLM to represent the 
methodology of the natural sciences– and there-
fore the CLM now only has historical relevance.
However, I also argue (with philosophers like 
John Mackie, Wesley Salmon, Peter Lipton and 
Nancy Cartwright) that causal explanation must 
be entangled from the CLM and that causal ex-
planation is not dependent on knowledge of laws, 








nor does it presuppose laws, as Hempel, Nagel etc argue. Probabilistic, single-case causal expla-
nation is widespread among historians and others – and therefore Hempelian ideas about explana-
tion, including causal explanation, are, philosophically speaking, old hat. We need to get rid of them 
– finally.
Although I was not familiar with the idealisational approach of the Poznań school of methodology 
when writing Die Konstruktion der Vergangenheit and Przekraczanie granic (Bordercrossings), I think 
this approach to scientific explanation is quite similar to the ideas of Imre Lakatos that I find convinc-
ing – especially the idea of a “heuristic core” of (temporarily irrefutable) theories, that is surrounded 
by a “protective belt” of supporting, adaptable and refutable hypotheses. “Normal” scientific practice 
consists mainly of the empirical and theoretical “fine tuning” of the hypotheses in the “protective belt” 
to the core. As long as this is done successfully, the “research programme” is (empirically and/or 
theoretically) “progressive”; if not, the research programme becomes (empirically and/or theoreti-
cally) stagnant over time and it degenerates, eventually becoming extinct after failing to find new sup-
porters. This Lakatosian view seems surprisingly similar to Brzechczyn’s elucidation of the dialec-
tic between “ídealisation” and “concretisation” according to the Poznań school, if I am not mistaken.
This leads me to Ewa Domańska’s question about how my idea of conceptual inversion connects 
to Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programmes. These are different and independent 
ideas, I think. Let me first state that I never argued that Lakatos’ methodology directly applies to 
the humanities, although this idea of course has its attractions. Secondly, Lakatos predominantly 
explains the dynamics and the dialectic within research programmes – of “normal science”, that is 
– and he does not have a lot to say about “scientific revolutions”. The “conceptual inversions” I am 
referring to, however, concern “revolutions” in the humanities in the sense that they concern the 
conceptual relations between succeeding “research programmes” – as far as the concepts of “re-
search programme” and “scientific revolution” apply to the humanities, of course. Although Kuhn’s 
theory of “paradigms” and “scientific revolutions” has often been used to conceptualise and explain 
the history of the humanities and social sciences, I am pretty sceptical in this regard. 
The main reason for my scepticism in this case concerns the question of epistemological support: 
because research programmes in the humanities are also political programmes, they behave and 
develop quite different from their counterparts in the sciences. The neoliberal economic research 
programme (of the Chicago school), for instance, has been empirically refuted over and over again 
by the factual behaviour of the financial markets – both during the dot-com bubble of the 1990s and 
finally during the economic meltdown since 2007 – but, nevertheless, not only is it alive and kicking, 
it remains hegemonic in academia. This continuing “zombie existence” of the neoliberal paradigm 
can only be explained by its support by the neoliberal political class and surely not by its convinc-
ing epistemological credentials. Nevertheless, neoliberal economic theory is part of the discipline of 
economics and has epistemological claims and credentials, however shaky.1 In this respect, its aca-
demic position can be compared to that of the state-supported versions of Marxist economic theory 
in the former communist states in Central and Eastern Europe during the period of “state socialism”.
The cognitive and political Doppelexistenz of theories in the human sciences may explain their sud-
den ups and downs, dependent on the political constellation. Marxist theories disappeared overnight 
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in Central and Eastern Europe after the Berlin Wall came down. And the political supporters of neo-
liberal theories are trying to get rid of all theoretical competition by getting rid of the humanities as 
such as we speak. In the UK and US, they do so by simply cutting the humanities off from all public 
funding (and the Netherlands will surely follow the Anglo-Saxon lead also this time). It is this politi-
cal, and one could say performative, character of theories in the humanities that makes it hard to en-
tangle their epistemological support from their political backing. At this point, it is clear that I have a 
fundamentally different view of the human sciences, including historiography, than Aviezer Tucker, 
to whom I shall return in a moment, and that I am sympathetic to White’s position in Metahistory.
Let me first deal with Monika Bobako’s question concerning my stance towards post-positivism 
and to the power/knowledge issue. I hope that my introduction answered her question as to my 
presumed “objectivist” leanings. There are none, because as regards the theory/evidence prob-
lem, I subscribe to Nelson Goodman’s view that “facts are small theories, and true theories are big 
facts”.2 All theories are underdetermined by the evidence and, therefore, I have positioned myself 
in a fundamentally pluralist framework within which several “true” descriptions and “true” theories 
of “reality” may coexist – like the wave and particle theories of light in physics or the theory of ac-
tion and systems theory in the social sciences – peacefully or not. But pluralism is not the same as 
relativism. This is the practical meaning of what I have called – following Hilary Putnam – “internal 
realism”. In addition, within post-positivism, the very distinction between facts and values becomes 
relative, because post-positivism implies post-foundationalism. Therefore, the presupposed dis-
tinction between factual statements having a foundation in experience and normative statements 
lacking this foundation can no longer be upheld. This does not mean that both types of statement 
are the same, of course, but that this distinction is relative and must be thought over.
In sum: there are no reasons to fear that “internal realism” is “power blind”, as Bobako fears it is. 
Which and whose values are hegemonic in disciplinary discourses is usually conditioned by politi-
cal power outside and inside the disciplines, in my view. 
Now let me deal with the criticism of Tucker and White, in this order. I agree with most of what 
Tucker argues philosophically about positivism and narrativism, but I disagree fundamentally with 
his Whig version of the history of historiography, including his interpretation of Ranke as the found-
ing father of scientific history (or historiography, in Tucker’s terminology). Although Tucker admits 
that values have always influenced history writing, he posits, in line with most self-congratulary 
and self-legitimising histories of the discipline, that there was a “great break” with Ranke: in scien-
tific historiography cognitive values form the basis for a consensus together with theories about 
information transmission in time. The primacy of cognitive epistemic values to other therapeutic, 
political, national, religious etc values marks the distinction between scientific and therapeutic his-
toriography. “A large, uniquely heterogeneous and uncoerced community accepts historiography 
founded on scientific cognitive values.”3
Although Tucker generally has a lot to say about the crucial role of evidence in the writing of his-
tory, he fails to provide us with any historical evidence for this familiar rosy picture of the rise of 
“value-free scientific history”. Consensus?4 Uncoerced? In history? Tucker’s remarkable reading of 
nineteenth-century historiography is at odds with my own reading of Ranke and von Humboldt and 








with most historiographical literature that I know.5 Alas, given the absence of argument and refer-
ences, there is no way of knowing on what grounds we disagree and on which basis he claims the 
remarkable capacity of distinguishing “legitimate” from “illegitimate” historians. Tucker states that 
“legitimate historiography is marked by the precedence of critical cognitive values over other val-
ues”, but this distinction is of course of little help because the problem is that conflicts about values 
– including cognitive values – like the famous “turtles all the way down”. Was Marx a “legitimate” 
historian or a “therapeutic” pseudohistorian? Tucker appears to think that he was an “illegitimate” 
historian, but many historians would disagree. Was von Treitschke a “legitimate” historian of Ger-
many or a “propagandist” of nationalist values in an historian’s guise? It would be interesting to 
read Tucker’s arguments in case because now he simply states that I got Ranke all wrong by con-
necting the rise of the historical school to the rise of nationalism. 
However this may be, there is overwhelming evidence for the deep connection between the rise 
of the historical school and the rise of nationalism – and my judgement in case is not only based 
on my own research, but also on the research of Georg Iggers, Daniel Woolf and Stefan Berger, 
to name just a few experts in modern historiography. And although professional historians have 
always presented themselves as myth busters as does Tucker – their record as (nationalist) myth 
makers is at least as impressive.6 So again, it is not an either–or issue here in history writing. There 
is no hegemony of “therapeutic” and other values before Ranke’s “great break” and a hegemony 
of epistemic values after, but there is a simultaneous presence of both types of values in history 
before and after Ranke. White surely got that right in Metahistory. 
Now let me answer White’s criticism and polemics by first establishing what we agree and what 
we disagree on, because in matters of intellectual opinion I am not a big fan of the “You are okay, 
I am okay” position. 
Of course, White is right that most authors develop their ideas in the course of time to some extent 
and that it makes little sense to criticise them for that. That would be very silly indeed. But I plead 
“not guilty” on this count, because I never criticised anybody in this manner – and that includes 
White. My reading of Ankersmit – see my introduction to this debate above – hopefully supports 
my credibility in this regard.
I also plead “not guilty” to White’s second charge, which accuses me of criticising authors based 
on second-hand readings of them. It is true that when I am dealing with authors, I also include dis-
cussions of their work, because other interpretations of authorial positions – their Wirkungsges-
chichte in Gadamer’s words – is all we have next to our own reading of them. As in my view, other 
interpretations shed light on how texts can be interpreted and I don’t see what is wrong with that. 
So when I criticised some of White’s arguments concerning the “fictionality” of historical writing – 
I will come back to that in a moment – I based my critique on my reading of White, but of course I 
found it not without significance that some other critics had read him in ways similar to me. And 
so I informed readers about the discussion concerning White and “supported” my arguments by 
including other critics of White, either in my text or in my footnotes. This does of course not mean, 
as White seems to suggest with his example of Wittgenstein, that my critique is only, or predomi-
nantly, based on a second-hand reading of his work. Actually, if he had read my Die Konstruktion 
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der Vergangenheit, he would have noticed that where I deal with Wittgenstein’s philosophy of lan-
guage, I am actually quoting from his Philosophische Untersuchungen – next to quoting from Sear-
le’s and Hamlyn’s interpretations.7 So, in my view, it is perfectly legitimate to build a critical argu-
ment on “a tissue of citation, quotation, paraphrase, and so forth of other people’s work” because 
neither the original text nor its citation or quotation, represents a “rock bottom” for interpretation 
and critical argument. All textual interpretation remains contingent on how parts are connected to 
wholes – and White’s misinterpretation of my position as a defense of the CLM, which is based on 
one line in one article, is a case in point. 
Actually, I think that what White is doing is also “a tissue of citation, quotation, paraphrase, and so 
forth of other people’s work”, notwithstanding his repeated claims that he is only analysing his-
torical texts as his “primary sources”. Let me quote (!), as my “witness” in case, Herman Paul, who 
surely cannot be suspected of an “unsympathetic reading” of White: 
Contrary to what is often asserted, then, the conceptual apparatus developed in Metahistory 
was not aimed at analysing historical narratives. The four analytic categories employed in the 
book – tropes, plots, arguments, and ideologies – were not dimensions of the historian’s writ-
ten texts, but aspects of the ‘metahistorical’ modes of realism underlying those textual forms 
of representation … Metahistory hardly dealt more than in the passing with textual fragments 
from historians and philosophers under discussion. What one misses in White is an analysis 
of the way in which the formalised schemata and patterns he elicits actually function in texts.8 
So, maybe, the sobering “lesson” to be learned from our exchange is never to privilege self-de-
scriptions of authors to other descriptions without a critical examination of the evidence involved 
– even in the case of reflexive historians.
Now, let me end with what White argues about the role of narrative. Here, I am aware that I may 
have given some readers of my arguments concerning narrative the wrong impression by only 
criticising some aspects of narrativism and by not making explicit which aspects I surely value. 
What I did – or what I intended to do – was criticise what looked like an expulsion of epistemologi-
cal questions and questions of explanatory logic from philosophy of history. This “expulsion” is the 
consequence of limiting philosophy of history to philosophy of historical writing. By arguing that 
preferences of historians for modes of emplotment etc are conditioned by aesthetic and ideologi-
cal reasons and are unconnected to issues of epistemology, White did just that in Metahistory, just 
like Ankersmit was doing by arguing that narrative substances are empty of any cognitive con-
tent (see my text above). Therefore, I was basically arguing for a balanced approach to philoso-
phy of history, including both the new questions that White and Ankersmit had put on the agenda 
concerning historical writing, and the old questions of epistemology and methodology concerning 
historical research. Again I was arguing against an either–or approach – and thus against the re-
duction of philosophy of history to philosophy of history writing – and thus “inverting” its previous 
reduction to the philosophy of historical research. With authors like Allan Megill, Carlo Ginzburg 
and Anthony Grafton, I regard the interconnections between history writing and historical research 
of constitutive importance for history as a cognitive enterprise – because the connection with “the 
real” is limiting the “fictionality” of history writing fundamentally. 9 








This, I haste to add, in no way implies a negative judgment on fictional ways of handling the past, by 
the way. To the contrary: elsewhere I have argued that authors of fiction usually have been much 
earlier than professional historians in adopting new forms and new contents in dealing with the past.
Neither does my argument imply, as White suggests, that questions of narrativity can be reduced to 
questions of the logic of singular descriptive statements. To the contrary, in my view narratological 
approaches to history writing have been very fruitful in opening our eyes to the perspectives and the 
constructive aspects and patterns embedded in our historical narratives. Maybe this is the moment 
to “confess” that the most recent volume that I edited (together with Stefan Berger) is based on nar-
ratological approaches of national histories.10 Therefore, my criticism of narrativism notwithstand-
ing, it is hard to conceive of my work in historiography without it. In the end not only doing history – as 
Pieter Geyl stated – but also thinking about doing history turns out to be “an argument without end”.
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